814

TOP SECRET

EUROPE

1.	. FRANCE: Government sees improvement in strike situation							
	Premier Queuille has informed US Ambassador Caffery of his							
	belief that the French strike situation has taken a turn for the							
	better, although he expects the Communists to try desperately	25X1 25X1 25X1						
	to prevent a government success with the coal miners. An							
	has told that he believes the	25X1						
	government will emerge from the present dangerous period	Queuille has informed US Ambassador Caffery of his at the French strike situation has taken a turn for the though he expects the Communists to try desperately int a government success with the coal miners. An leas told that he believes the least told that he believes the least will emerge from the present dangerous period lably strengthened. Indicates the lably strengthened. Indicates lably strengthened. Indicates lably strengthened indicates lably strengthened. Indicates lably strengthened indicates lably strengthened. Indicates lably strengthened in the point of settlement; and (c) lable strike is on the point of settlement; and (c) lable strengthened in the strike funds will cause the lable strengthened in the strike funds will cause the lable structure by 20 October. The Embassy, which has done of having large funds at their disposal, believes any large funds at their disposal, believes any						
	considerably strengthened. indicates	25X1						
	that: (a) the danger of railway stoppage no longer exists; (b)							
	the Lorraine steel strike is on the point of settlement; and (c)							
	lack of enthusiasm and insufficient strike funds will cause the							
	coal miners to return by 20 October. The Embassy, which has							
	been told by "trustworthy observers" that the Communists							
	give evidence of having large funds at their disposal, believes							
	that the Kremlin will furnish the French Communists any							
	money they may need for sabotaging the national economy.							

(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the Government is showing an increasing capability of halting the present wave of strikes, but that: (a) the Communist-dominated miners' union will be able to prolong the coul strike beyond 20 October; and (b) the Queuille Government will be unable in the long run to reverse the fundamental economic and political trends which are working toward its downfall.)

MEAR EAST-AFRICA

25X1

2. INDIA: Change to pro-US attitude reported-

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(a) Prime Minister Nehru is no longer pro-Soviet; (b) the basic position of the Government of India (GOI) has shifted away from the USSR; (c) the attitude of the GOI toward the US is markedly different from that of a year ago; and (d) in any crisis there would be no doubt where India stood.

(CIA Comment: CIA believes that because of India's tendency to be opportunistic in advancing its national aspirations, India cannot be depended on to mainiais any pro-western attitude.)

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TAR EAST

3. CHRIA: Imminent fall of Chinchow—US Embassy Hanking reports that the fall of Chinh Hen (ilso called Chinchow, a key Nationalist supply base linking Menchuria with North China) is imminent. The Embassy believes that Tientsin and Peiping are also seriously threadened by the current Communist offensive in North China. The Embassy indicates its intention, if Chinhsien falls, to advise the Peiping and Tientsin Consulate Generals to warm US citizens in their districts to leave while normal facilities are available, although the Embassy realines that such action would have a lyerne effects on the military and economic situation of the National Government.

(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the Nationalist forces will be unable to prevent the fall of Chinhsien. Through the capture of this key city, the Communists will gain: (a) virtual control of the Manchurian corridor; (b) possession of large stores of supplies destined for Nationalist forces in Mukden; and (c) an excellent base for operations southward against the Peiping-Tientsin area. In addition, the capture of Chinhsien probably would presage the fall or evacuation of Mukden, thereby releasing the majority of Communist troops in Manchuria for a North China drive.)